This paper argues that an important part of movements in asset prices may be caused by neither external news nor irrationality, but by the revelation of information by the trading process itself. Two models are developed that illustrate this general idea. One model is based on investor uncertainty about the quality of other investors' information; the other is based on widespread dispersion of information and small costs to trading. The analysis is used to suggest a possible rational explanation of the October 1987 crash. (JEL G14, G12)
economists and other outside observers.1 Indeed, this was precisely the approach taken by supporters of market rationality immediately after the 1987 crash. This paper proposes a "middle way" between these two polar views of asset-price movements. Investors possess diverse useful information about fundamentals. Aggregating this information is a difficult task. Although there are specific conditions under which market prices successfully aggregate all relevant information, there is no presumption that they always do. The possibility of imperfect aggregation implies an alternative to external news and irrationality as a potential source of asset-price movements: some price changes may be caused by "internal" news. That is, asset prices can change because initially the market does an imperfect job of revealing the relevant information possessed by different investors and because developments within the market can then somehow cause more of that information to be revealed.
If each investor recognizes that others possess objectively useful information about value that is not reflected in prices, then changes in the investor's opinion of what others' opinions are will cause the investor to change his or her own estimate of value. Thus Keynes's famous "beauty contest" interpretation of the stock market, in which market participants are more interested in others' beliefs than in their own estimates of fundamentals, applies even when investors are holding stocks for their fundamental payoffs rather than in the hopes of selling to someone else at a higher price. This paper demonstrates that there can indeed be rational changes in the market's assessment of fundamentals without the arrival of outside news. Sections I and II present two different models of rational price movements arising from "internal" rather than "external" news. A model of rational movements in asset prices arising from the trading process must have two properties. The first is that the market's initial reaction to news does not fully reflect investors' assessments of the news's implications for fundamentals. The second is that further trading reveals additional information about those assessments. The two specific models that I present incorporate these two central components in different ways.
The model developed in Section I is based on information of heterogeneous quality and uncertainty about the quality of others' information. Uncertainty about the quality of others' information can cause investors who in fact possess the best available information to place some weight incorrectly (but rationally) on the market price and little weight on their own information in attempting to estimate value; alternatively, it can cause investors who have inferior information to place excessive weight on that information. As market developments (e.g., market responses to buy and sell orders arising from liquidity needs) reveal information about others' uncertainty, it becomes clearer whose information is superior. The best available information therefore becomes reflected more fully in asset prices.
The central feature of Section II's model, in contrast, is dispersion of information among a large number of investors. If the knowledge that is helpful in evaluating the implications of a piece of news for future payouts and discount factors is widely dispersed, the incentives for any single investor to trade on the basis of his or her knowledge may be small. If there are costs to trading, investors possessing relevant information may therefore choose not to trade immediately. As other considerations cause these investors to trade, however, their information will affect their asset demands and therefore be partially incorporated in ' Given the magnitude of many of the price changes that occur without apparent news and the range of stocks they affect, it appears unlikely that they could be caused either by the contemporaneous arrival of private information or by strategic trading based on previously acquired private information. For example, it is difficult to imagine what private information could have caused the October 1987 crash. Similarly, the absence of negative serial correlation in daily stockmarket returns suggests that the price changes are not caused by short-run changes in liquidity.
prices. With many such investors, the resulting price movements may be substantial. I present some simple examples in which investors collectively possess information implying that the market is initially mispriced by an average of 5-10 percent but in which the expected gain to any single individual from trading is only a few dollars.
The two models are not mutually exclusive. One possibility is that the mechanism described in Section I is central to large price movements without significant outside news (such as the 1987 crash) while the mechanism illustrated in Section II is more relevant to smaller day-to-day variations in prices that occur without apparent news. Indeed, I argue at the end of Section I that a variation on the model presented there provides a possible explanation of the 1987 crash.
In presenting my particular models, I do not intend to argue that the specific mechanisms they illustrate are the only important channels through which trading can reveal information; nor do I wish to argue that all changes in stock prices are fully rational.2 My goals are more limited: I want to show that it is possible for there to be rational changes in asset prices without external news and to describe some mechanisms through which this could occur. At a broader level, my goal is to argue that the fact that changes in stock prices are often unaccompanied by evident news is a major puzzle and that theories that attribute this fact to the revelation of information by the trading process offer a promising route to understanding it.
I. Uncertainty About the Quality of Others' Information
This section presents a simple model that formalizes the idea that heterogeneous information quality and uncertainty about the quality of others' information can give rise to rational revisions in estimates of fundamentals without external news. It also describes how such a revision might have played an important role in the 1987 crash.
A. The Model
There is a perfectly inelastic supply of Q units of the economy's single risky asset. The asset's payoff, a, is distributed normally with mean ,t and variance Va; ,t is assumed to be sufficiently large that the probability of a negative realization is negligible. In addition, there is a perfectly elastic supply of a riskless asset yielding a zero rate of return.
There are many investors, each with identical constant absolute risk-aversion utility, Ui = -e-ci. Investor i's consumption, Ci, is given by xia + yi, where xi and yi are the investor's holdings of the risky and safe asset, respectively.
Each investor receives some private information about the payoff to the risky asset. There are three potential signals: sj = a + Ej (1 = 1, 2,3), where Ei is distributed normally with mean zero and variance Vj. The disturbance 82 is given by 81 + 82; E3 equals 82 + 83; and a, El, 82, and 83 are independent. Thus if s2 is known, s3 provides no information about a. Similarly, s2 provides no information about a if s1 is known.
There are two possible distributions of signals, each occurring with probability . In the first, half of the investors receive signal 2This paper is one of a number of recent (and largely independent) papers concerned with the possibility of rational reassessments of fundamentals without the arrival of outside news. These papers suggest a variety of mechanisms other than those presented here through which such rational reassessments can occur: self-fulfilling expectations (Leonard J. sl, and half receive s2; in the second distribution, half receive s2' and half receive s3. All of the investors receiving a given sj receive the same realization of the signal. Each investor knows the quality of his or her own signal, but not the quality of the information received by others. In particular, an investor receiving 52 does not know whether half of the agents are receiving s3, in which case 52 provides the best available information about a, or half are receiving s1 in which case strictly superior information is available.
To make trade possible, I assume that the supply of the risky asset is random. In the absence of some source of uncertainty other than heterogeneous information, the equilibrium asset price would be fully revealing. I therefore assume that the asset supply, Q, is normally distributed with mean Q and variance VQ. Q is independent of a and the sI's. Each investor's demand depends on the signal he or she receives, the signal's quality, and the price of the asset. Formally, one can think of each investor as submitting a demand schedule for the asset. The price of the asset is then determined by the requirement that total demand equal supply.
Part B of this section demonstrates the two key characteristics of this economy. The first is that the asset's price does not reveal with certainty the distribution of information quality. Thus information that is available to a large number of investors is initially incorporated only imperfectly into the asset's price. The second is that a shift in asset supply after the initial price has been determined reveals the distribution of information quality and therefore causes a discrete change in price.
Part C then characterizes the equilibrium behavior of each type of investor. As I describe there, the uncertainty of agents receiving signal 52 about the distribution of information quality makes their demand functions nonlinear in 52 The source of the result that market activity can cause rational investors to revise their assessments of fundamentals is simply that the response of prices to noninformational changes in supply can provide information beyond that conveyed by initial prices. Thus, although the model presented here is highly stylized, the central result is likely to carry over to settings with more complex and realistic financial markets and informational heterogeneity.
Assuming that investors initially attached some small probability to a change in supply and a second round of trading, for example, would not alter the argument. Assuming that investors were uncertain about the magnitude of the supply shift, on the other hand, would prevent investors from learning the distribution of information quality with certainty in the second round of trading but would not affect the result that a noninformational event allowed investors to learn more about each other's information and thus led to rational revisions in prices. In this case, the amount that investors learned about the distribution of information quality would be increasing in the mean (and decreasing in the variance) of the shift in supply.
Finally, in the specific model presented here, the price of an option would reveal investors' uncertainty about the asset's payoff and would thus reveal the quality of investors' information. Thus the introduction of an option market would mean that the response of price to a noninformational event no longer reveals information. All that is needed to restore the ability of market activity to convey information about investors' uncertainty is that the form of uncertainty be sufficiently complicated that it cannot be summarized in a single parameter (namely, the price of the option); if this is the case, then in general the price of options is no longer perfectly revealing about how stock prices would respond to a change in supply.
One important implication of the model is that rational investors are concerned with the beliefs and uncertainties of other investors. When knowledge is heterogeneous, information about what others believe is valuable. Indeed, when most investors' information is small relative to that embodied in market prices, most investors place much greater weight on the market price than on their own information in attempting to as3This discussion of the slope of the demand curve of the agents receiving S3 neglects the fact that the change in P in response to the shift in supply provides these investors with additional information. As described in Subsection I-C, the initial P reveals to them that S2 and Q must lie on some nonlinear locus. If the shift in supply reveals the distribution of information quality to the investors receiving S2, their demands become linear, and so those receiving S3 now observe some linear combination of S2 and Q. Thus they now possess additional information about S2. It is possible for this new information about s2 to cause them to respond to the change in supply exactly as would investors observing a high-quality signal. Because of the nonlinearity of the initial demand curves, however, for any given value of S2 this is a measure zero possibility. Thus this complication does not alter the conclusion that the investors observing S2 deduce that other agents are receiving s1 if and only if they observe that other agents' demand curves have slope 1/pV. sess fundamental values. For want of a better term, a change in prices caused by the revelation of information about investors' uncertainty could be described as a change in the "confidence" of market participants. Thus, such phenomena as concern with other investors' behavior and the importance of "confidence" and "sentiment" in price movements, which are often cited in support of models of irrational asset-price movements (e.g., Robert J. Shiller [1984] , J. Bradford De Long et al. [1990] , and Keynes's "beauty contest" metaphor), are consistent with rationality. In a world of heterogeneous information, even an investor who is in the market "for the long haul" will be preoccupied with attempting to gauge others' beliefs and confidence.
C. Description of the Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the initial round of trading is described by functions x1(xl, P), x2(s2,P), and X3(3, P) giving the demands of each type of agent as functions of the observed signal and price. Given these functions, the asset's price for a given realization of the signals and of supply is the price that equates demand and supply. Specifically, the equilibrium asset demand functions occur when, assuming demand functions xi(si, P) (i = 1,2,3), if each investor draws inferences optimally about the conditional distribution of a given his or her signal, the prevailing price, and these demand functions, the optimal choices of the amounts to purchase are given by the assumed xi(-) functions.
The behavior of a type-I investor (i.e., an investor receiving signal s1) is straightforward. Given the assumptions of normality and exponential utility, the investor's de- A type-2 investor's prior probability that other investors are type l's is 1. In general, however, observing 52 and P causes the investor to update that probability. For example, if the variance of P conditional on the observation of 52 is lower when other investors are type l's than when they are type 3's, an extreme observation of P (given 52) lowers the estimated probability that others are type l's. The fact that the probability that others are type l's varies with P implies that both uncertainty about a and the information content of P are not constant. As a result, type-2 investors' demand functions are not linear.
The nonlinearity of x2(*) and X3(*) makes an analytical solution of the model impossi- I first posit initial x2(-) and X3(-) functions at the points on these grids (namely, the demand functions that would prevail if all investors were type 2's or type 3's, respectively). I then solve for representative type-2 and type-3 investors' optimal asset holdings at each of these points if other investors' behavior is described by the assumed demand functions at these points and is piecewise linear between the points (and linear outside the ranges considered). The calculations of expected utility as a function of asset holdings require approximating integrals numerically; for example, a type-3 investor knows neither s2 nor Q but knows, from knowledge of x3(s3, P) and x2( ), how Q must vary Figure 2 shows the demand function of type-2 investors (again for s2 = ,u). For comparison, the figure also shows the demand functions these investors would have if the distribution of information quality were publicly known. All of the demand functions are symmetric around P = ,u; thus for simplicity they are shown only for P <,u. The impact of price on demand is influenced by two factors. The first is the probability that the price is informative (i.e., that other investors are type l's). At extreme values the price is very unlikely to be informative; as a result, the impact of price on demand is large, and demand is virtually identical to what it would be if the investors were certain that others were type 3's. The second factor is how the probability that the price is informative varies with P. A change in price affects type-2 investors' estimate of a both by its effect on their estimate of si conditional on other investors being type l's and through its impact on the estimated probability that the price they observe is in fact a signal about a. At very low prices, the second effect dominates, so that type-2 investors' estimate of a is declining in the price. As a result, over some ranges demand is more responsive to price than it would be under either distribution of information quality if the distribution were publicly known.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the impact of a shift in supply after the initial round of trading. The figure shows, as a function of P, how the price of the asset changes if the response of the market to a change in supply reveals to type-2 investors that others are type l's. This information causes type-2 investors to place more weight on price in estimating value and therefore pushes the price further away from its mean; thus the price falls if it is initially less than ,t and rises if it is initially greater than A.6
D. The 1987 Crash
This analysis suggests a candidate source of large changes in prices without the arrival of significant external news about dividends or discount factors: the process of learning about the quality of other investors' information can lead to sudden shifts in the weight that investors put on their own information and thus can lead to sudden changes in prices. Indeed, this process may have played an important role in the 1987 stock-market crash.
Any candidate explanation of the crash must face several difficulties. The most obvious is that there was no apparent significant news about fundamentals on the weekend before October 19. But there are other puzzles as well. One is why the crash occurred at a time of large noninformational sales (James F. Gammill, Jr., and Terry A. Marsh, 1988; Shiller, 1989). Another is why there was no rapid rebound from the crash, as would be expected if the crash resulted from a failure of liquidity or from a misinterpretation of the noninformational sales. A final puzzle-and one that is rarely discussed in accounts of the crash-is why market participants, in response to surveys, cited market developments themselves and the continuing high federal budget deficits as important sources of the crash (Shiller, 1989) ; in simple models of asset-pricing, neither factor would lead to any change in prices, much less to a crash.
Here I sketch a highly stylized account of the crash that provides candidate explanations for all of these puzzles. Thus, although I make no claim that the account explains the crash in its entirety, I believe that it represents a potentially important element of the crash.
6Because the response of type-1 investors to a change in P is independent of s1, learning that other investors are type l's provides type-2 investors with no additional information about the distribution of s1 conditional on others being type l's. As a result, the new price when it becomes known that others are type l's is a deterministic function of P (and S2). In contrast, the nonlinearity of x2(*) causes type-3 investors to obtain new information about S2 when type-2 investors learn that others are type 3's (see footnote 3). This makes the response of the asset price to this news depend not just on P and S2 but also on Q and S3.
My stylized account is a straightforward variation on the model presented above. It consists of two parts. The first part is a description of the situation before the crash. Suppose that well before the crash there was some new piece of information whose implications were difficult to evaluate; for concreteness, and for consistency with the survey evidence, suppose that the information was that there would be unprecedentedly large government budget deficits for the foreseeable future. It was probably difficult for market participants to gauge how easily others could estimate the implications of this news for future profits. To simplify, imagine that there were two possibilities. The first, and most likely, was that most investors could estimate the implications relatively precisely, while the remainder had estimates of medium and low quality; the second was that no investors were able to estimate the implications with high precision, a few could estimate them with medium precision, and the remainder could estimate them with low precision. As it happened, however, it was the second possibility that occurred. In addition, the realization of the intermediate-quality signal was low, and that of the low-quality signal was high (and/or the realization of Q was low).
In this situation, all investors, believing that most others were trading on superior information, put little weight on their own information. In the absence of a high-quality signal, however, the main determinants of the equilibrium price were in fact the low-quality signal and the random shock to asset supply. The result was that stock prices were high. Each individual investor, however, believed that the most likely reason that prices were high was that there were other investors who possessed reliable information that large and persistent budget deficits were not extremely harmful to future earnings.
The second part of the account concerns the crash itself. In this situation of "rationally overpriced" stock prices, a large quantity of noninformational selling orders arrived on the morning of October 19, 1987 (or late in the afternoon of October 16). As described above, natural extensions of the theoretical model would imply that the amount of information revealed by a noninformational change in supply about investors' uncertainty is increasing in the size of the change; thus the large quantity of mechanical selling in effect served as a powerful experiment for revealing investors' confidence in their assessments of fundamentals. Investors, believing that others were confident of the market's value, expected the sales to cause only a small fall in prices. When a larger-than-expected fall occurred at the opening of trading on October 19 (and/or at the close of trading on October 16), investors deduced that no one in fact possessed high-quality information that justified the high level of stock prices. Investors who observed the signal of intermediate quality therefore realized that the best available information suggested that deficits are in fact highly detrimental to future earnings. They moved rapidly to sell stocks. Other investors observed this and hence also changed their estimates of fundamentals sharply. Thus, a noninformational event triggered a "market meltdown."7 Grossman (1988), Genotte and Leland (1990), and Jacklin et al. (1992) also present rational theories of the 1987 crash. In these theories, the crash arose from investors' inability to determine whether trading was information-based. In Grossman's model and Genotte and Leland's model, investors, not knowing that initial sell orders on October 16 and 19 to a large extent represented the execution of portfolio-insurance programs, believed that others possessed information that had caused them to change their assessments of fundamentals drastically; they therefore revised down their own estimates of fundamentals. Jacklin et al.'s 7A natural question is whether this mechanism could be large enough to account for a crash of the size that occurred on October 19. Unfortunately, the theoretical model is so stylized that it cannot be used to make even approximate predictions concerning the magnitudes of the price changes that could result from investors learning about the quality of others' information. Thus it is not yet possible to address this question formally.
account is essentially the reverse of this. In their explanation, investors did not realize that many of the purchases in the months preceding October were driven by portfolio insurance and therefore revised up their own estimates of fundamentals. When the portfolio-insurance sales on October 16 revealed the extent of insurance, investors realized that the purchases of the preceding months did not reflect important information and therefore revised down their estimates of fundamentals sharply. Both Grossman's account and Genotte and Leland's account are premised on the idea that there can be large movements in prices that genuinely do convey new information about fundamentals without any evident news: unless such movements are possible, investors would never rationally misinterpret a large price movement caused by noninformational selling or buying as providing information about fundamentals. Thus, these models do not provide a candidate explanation of the general phenomenon of large price shifts without news. The models also predict that the price drop should have been reversed as soon as it became known to a substantial number of market participants that the selling on October 19 was not information-based. Since this occurred shortly after the crash, the models predict that there should have been an extremely rapid rebound. No such rebound occurred.
In contrast, Jacklin et al.'s account, like the one presented here, is based on uncertainty about the distribution of information quality and consequent imperfections in information aggregation. Although the specifics of the two accounts differ, they are not mutually exclusive; thus they should be viewed as complementary.
II. The Dispersion of Information
This section describes an entirely different possible source of delayed reaction of asset prices to publicly available information. The central idea is that information about the implications of some piece of news for asset values may be widely dispersed and that this may cause the incentives for any given investor to trade solely to take advantage of that information to be small.8
A. Assumptions
The basic structure of the model is similar to that of the previous section. There is a single risky asset supplied inelastically; its payoff, a, is distributed normally with mean ,u and variance Va. There is also a riskless asset yielding zero rate of return available in perfectly elastic supply. There are M investors who receive signals about the payoff to the risky asset. Investor i has utility function Ui= -e-PCi
There are three sets of differences from the model of Section I. The first differences concern the signals that investors receive. In this section, I make the standard assumption that investors' signals are independent and of uniform quality. I also assume that there is a component of the asset's payoff about which no investors receive signals. I thus write a = a0 + t, where a0 and t are independent normal random variables with means ,u and 0 and variances VO and V.K (VO + V.K = V,). Investor i receives the signal Si = a0 + ei, where ei is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance V,; the ei's are independent of one another and of a0 and w.9 8The model in Albert S. Kyle (1985) also has the property that information initially held privately is gradually incorporated into prices through trading activity. My model differs from Kyle's in two important respects. First, I show that the potential gains to an investor from trading on the basis of superior information may be small. I therefore focus on small costs to trading rather than strategic manipulation of timing as the source of gradual incorporation of information into prices. Second, I show explicitly that the incorporation of private information into prices can plausibly cause significant changes in the aggregate value of the market. The very small gains to trading on the basis of private information that I find suggest that, for the aggregate market, small trading costs appear more likely than strategic choice of timing to be an important source of gradual incorporation of information into prices. 9The parameter co is introduced simply so that observing a large number of signals would not allow one to estimate the payoff with high precision.
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Second, I assume that, in addition to the investors possessing private information, there is a class of risk-neutral uninformed investors. I refer to these investors as arbitrageurs. Their presence ensures that the asset's price is always equal to the expected value of the payoff given publicly observable information.
The third and most important differences from the model of Section I concern the structure of trading. Trading occurs at T dates. At date t, quantity Qt of the asset is supplied; the Qt's are independently and identically distributed normal variables with mean 0 and variance VQ and are independent of ao, w, and the e's. The arbitrageurs trade on each date. Each informed investor, however, trades on at most one date. Specifically, an informed investor can either pay a cost F, in which case he or she trades at the first date, or forgo the cost, in which case the investor with probability p trades at a date selected at random and with probability 1 -p does not trade at all. The decision concerning whether to pay the fixed cost must be made before observing si. After the final trading date, the payoff is realized, and consumption occurs.
These assumptions capture the fact that trading on the basis of information is more costly when the trading is done immediately. If, for example, there are transactions costs, trading immediately requires incurring those costs. But if trading is postponed, other considerations, such as liquidity needs or the desire to trade on the basis of other information, may cause the investor to trade at some later date; at this point there are no costs associated with incorporating the information into demand. Similarly, costs of processing information to arrive at an estimate of fundamentals are likely to be higher when trading is done immediately.
Part B of this section describes the equilibrium of the model. Part C shows that the incentives to pay the fixed cost and trade at the initial date can be small and that the price movements arising from informed investors' subsequent trades can be significant. I demonstrate these results in two ways. First, I perform a back-of-theenvelope calculation that overstates the incentives to trade at the initial date and understates the magnitudes of price movements at subsequent trading dates. Second, I report the results of fully solving the model numerically.
B. Description of the Equilibrium
There are two requirements for equilibrium at a single trading date given the number of informed investors trading at that date. First, each informed investor must be choosing the quantity of the asset to purchase optimally given his or her information and given the impact of his or her purchases on the equilibrium price. Second, the price of the asset must equal the expectation of its payoff conditional on the information available to the arbitrageurs.
Finding this equilibrium is a conceptually straightforward (though algebraically complicated) extension of the analysis in Kyle (1989) . Given the assumptions of exponential utility and normally distributed shocks, informed investors' demands are linear in the items in their information sets. The result is that the sum of informed investors' demands less the random supply is a linear combination of the investors' average signal and the supply; thus the arbitrageurs (and the informed investors themselves) face a standard signal-extraction problem. This causes the supply curve facing each informed investor to be linear. Equilibrium at a single trading date occurs when utilitymaximization on the part of a representative informed investor, taking as given the coefficients of the other informed investors' demand functions (and hence taking as given the signal-extraction problem and asset supply curve that he or she faces), implies an asset demand function with those same coefficients.
The equilibria in the individual periods, given the number of informed investors trading at each date, determine the benefits to trading at each date. The equilibrium allocation of informed investors across trading dates is then determined by the require-ment that investors be indifferent concerning whether to pay the fixed cost and trade at the initial date.
Consider the problem facing an informed investor trading at date t. The investor possesses three pieces of information. The first is the previous period's price, Pt-1. The presence of the arbitrageurs implies that Pt-1 is the expectation of a0 given all information that is publicly available through date t -1; one can therefore write a0 = Pt -1 + ut _ 1, where ut _ 1 is uncorrelated with Pt_1. As will be seen below, u t1 is normal. Let Vu t-1 denote its variance.10
The investor's second piece of information is his or her own signal, si = ao + ei Since ei is independent of other informed investors' e's and of the Q's, it is independent of ut_1
The investor's third piece of information is the sum of other investors' demands minus the asset supply, Ej1 i xj -Q, where the sum is taken over the other informed investors who trade at time t (and where time subscripts are suppressed for simplicity).11
As described above, investor i's demand will be linear in the three pieces of information he or she observes. In addition, I will show that if si = Pt_ 1 and Ejx ixj = Q, the investor's demand is zero. Imposing this condition at the outset for expositional simplicity, the investor's demand takes the form: In such a setting, changes in asset prices without news would be commonplace. Suppose there were some event whose implications for future profits were uncertain. The event would lead to an initial jump in asset prices in response to the "conventional wisdom" about the event's implications and to any trading by informed investors. In addition, however, the gradual appearance of investors who had not yet traded in response to that information, many of whom possessed estimates of the implications of that information that differed from the market's, would lead to additional changes in prices. Thus the market, rather than information about fundamentals, would be the source of price movements, and asset prices would respond to news that was already publicly available. Yet those phenomena would reflect rational revisions of estimates of fundamentals.
III. Conclusion
Stock-market analysts, and economists, are very often unable to identify news that could plausibly have led to observed changes in stock prices. This paper shows that this fact need not reflect a failure either of market analysts or of the hypothesis of investor rationality. It demonstrates that there can be rational changes in the market's estimates of fundamentals without the arrival of any new information other than that conveyed by the market itself, and presents two models that illustrate this general idea. I conclude the paper by arguing that this view-that price movements that occur without any clear news often do convey information about fundamentals-has several important advantages over the alternative view that they largely represent "fads" (Shiller, 1984) Finally, market participants and analysts appear to believe that the market does not completely process public information immediately and that the trading process gradually conveys information about investors' beliefs. Shiller (1989) reports that many investors attributed the 1987 crash to the budget deficit and to general levels of indebtedness in the economy, despite the absence of any significant recent news about these subjects; he also reports that investors considered the declines in the market in the week before October 19 and the initial decline that morning to be the most important proximate "news" triggering the crash. Analyses of market developments, such as those in the Wall Street Journal, often describe price changes (particularly the direction and size of reactions to news) as conveying information. Similarly, it is not uncommon for the Journal to describe price movements as representing revisions of the market's assessment of the implications of past news.
In an extreme "efficient-markets" view of the functioning of financial markets, asset markets mechanically process all information and effortlessly arrive at optimal estimates of fundamentals. This extreme view has not fared well empirically. Much recent work advocates the opposite extreme: that markets are grossly irrational, with large and unfounded waves of optimism and pessimism causing sudden price ghifts and large departures of prices from fundamentals. This paper suggests an intermediate view: that the market is, in effect, engaged in a many-dimensional and a many-agent inference problem with multiple layers of uncertainty and heterogeneity and with frictions in the trading process. As a result, market prices are not related in any simple and mechanical way to news. Nonetheless, market participants are groping toward reasonable estimates of fundamentals, and price movements, even when they are unrelated to outside news, generally represent improvements in assessments of underlying fundamentals.
